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Abstract 
The leveraging of control is the possibility for the controlling shareholder to lower his direct 
participation in capital through a convergence of financial and economic interest with other 
shareholders in the firm. In this paper, the setting of a coalition contract is done by awarding 
stocks to managers and executives. This paper analyses it jointly, on one side, in a rationale of 
economic incentive and, on the other side, in a rationale of political coalition of the initial 
dominant shareholder with managers and executives/employees. It is shown that the two 
logics are not opposite but complementary. The sharing of the private benefits within 
members of the new coalition is at the heart of a new implicit contract. The initial controlling 
shareholder “buys” efficient efforts by awarding a stake of capital to managers or executives, 
but also by allowing them to share a part of the private benefits and to join a new dominant 
group. Even if the effort function of the executives is weakly productive, a targeted broad 
diffusion of new stocks may still respect the coherence between an economic incentive 
rationale and a political substitution rationale.  
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The setting of a coalition contract between controlling shareholder, managers 
and executives: How to mix incentive and political logics? 
  
Introduction 
The idea that managers, executives and employees stock ownership can become a tool in 
optimizing the power of control by a dominant shareholder is not new. The empirical analysis 
of executive stock option plans or employee equity ownership as a defense measure to keep 
the control of a firm has been proposed in the United States context by Dhillon and Ramirez 
(1994) or Park and Song (1995) or in France by Desbrières (1997a). In analyzing stock option 
or stock ownership plan mechanisms, the standard incentive theory considers, on one side, the 
managers and/or the employees and, on the other side, the shareholders considered as a whole 
group. It seems more convenient to refer to the existence of a controlling group among the 
shareholders (cf. La Porta et al., 2000). A situation of a control is a documented empirical fact 
in many European or Asian countries. This question is now addressed even in the United 
States (Holderness, 2009). Appropriation of private benefits of control is the consequence of a 
situation of control. 
 
Stock options and stock ownership plans are categories of incentive contracts allowing 
managers and executives to appropriate themselves a part of the economic profit of the firm. 
Stock options are often viewed as limited to top managers and are questioned as too 
concentrated in the firm, particularly in European countries. The concentration of stock 
options to top managers in Europe doesn’t follow the American custom to diffuse options to 
middle management and to executives in the firm. In this paper, we focus on a stylized stock 
ownership plan and its diffusion between two categories of beneficiaries: managers and 
executives. The analysis will be developed on two different dimensions: an economic 
rationale of incentive and a political rationale of collusion between the initial controlling 
shareholder and new partners to form a new controlling group. Awarding stock ownership 
plan can satisfy both logics, so their diffusion in firms is doubly explained. We will introduce 
the idea of leverage of control in the sense of a political and economical rationale for 
collusion. A new controlling group is politically searched by the initial controlling 
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shareholder for he/she can relatively reduce his investment in the firm and still hold the bulk 
of the political power. Furthermore, on the financial ground, he will limit his wealth under-
diversification. The concept of “leverage of control” means that the power is still in the hand 
of the initial controlling shareholder, but he shares it with allied. He/she continues to 
appropriate private benefit, but he has now to share it. The economic incentive of managers 
and others employee who may create more value is acknowledged in a framework of 
asymmetry of information as far as the controlling shareholder do not know exactly the future 
gain in cash flow. Beside their economic logic of incentive and beside the desire of top 
managers to entrench, the large diffusion of stocks or stock options to others executives or 
employees of the firm is explained by the existence of a “political” leverage. We consider that 
the incentive hypothesis is true and that stimulated managers and executives will produce 
some effort. The analysis takes into account that awarding new shares through stock 
ownership plans (or stock option plans) implies a dilution effect for the existing shareholders 
and that sharing the power will also imply a sharing of the private benefits of control. 
 
We analyze the trade-off and complementarities between the economic logic of incentive and 
the political logic of leverage of control. We show that stock ownership plans are a tool for 
leverage of control in a political logic of collusion. The research of a leverage of control by 
awarding new stocks takes place in a double logic of economic creation of value through 
incentives and of substitution of the initial dominant shareholder by managers and executives. 
Respecting the global maintenance of control, both logics are strictly compatible and push in 
the same direction. The sharing of the private benefits in the new dominant group with 
managers is a strong motivation for managers and employees to join the new controlling 
group. We show that there is generally enough room to negotiate what is an implicit contract 
of coalition. The large diffusion of stocks to other categories of executives (or employees) 
may still respect the coherence between the economic incentive logic and the political 
substitution logic. Awarding employees with weakly efficient stock (option) plans finds a 
“political” explanation. If the economic incentive is globally strong at the executives’ level, a 
positive leverage of control develops in favor of the shareholders and both economic and 
political logics converge. Nevertheless, even if the executives’ effort functions are weakly 
productive, we show that a joint equilibrium is still possible, but the dominant shareholder 
will have then to consider a trade-off between economic and political logics. In that sense, 
this paper brings some explanation to largely diffused stock option or stock ownership plans 
and on the setting of an implicit coalition contract. 
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The paper is organized as follows. The first Section analyzes the literature crossing leverage 
of control and stock option/stock ownership incentive plans. Section 2 gives the assumptions 
of the model of stock awarding to employees; the third section analyses the condition for 
setting a coalition contract with the efficiently stimulated managers. The fourth Section 
enlarges the model by identifying two groups of managers and middle executives in the firm. 
A conclusion draws the main results and points out the perspectives.  
 
1-Leverage of control: A review of literature  
The leverage of control is the possibility for the controlling shareholder to lower his direct 
participation in capital through a convergence of financial interest with other stakeholders in 
the firm. The different mechanisms of incentive contracts and financial contracts are the 
background for negotiations that most often take the form of employees stock ownership 
plans (ESOPs) or contracts of stock options. The former is an incentive mechanism which 
implies an initial decision to buy shares. ESOPs are generally offered to a large number of (or 
all) employees. An institutional framework exists in most countries where ownership plans 
are encouraged and are tax deductible. For instance, in France a new regulation allows a 
discount in employees stock subscription up to 30% of the share price, and the “Loi de 
Modernisation Sociale” gives the employees a seat at the board as soon as their stock 
ownership is above 3% of the capital. In the US, Oyer et al. (2004) studied the breadth of 
stock options plans through the firm’s employees using the Bureau of Labor statistics who 
defines broad-based stock option plans as those awarded at least to 20% of the employees. 
Considering a sample of stock options of any kind awarded in 1999 in public or private firms, 
52% of them were « Broad plans ». Looking only at public firms the proportion of those 
having implemented « Broad plans » in 1999 increases to 11.8%1. The stock options awarded 
to « non-executives » represented, at that time, 4.4% of the outstanding shares of these firms. 
 
The importance of the leverage of control can be underlined both through the issue of stock 
options plans and employee stock ownership plans, although these two contracts are different. 
The large diffusion of stock options is particularly common in the United States. The 
systematic award of options plans to the management of the firm, but also to its executives 
and employees, leads Hall et Murphy (2003) to the idea that too many options are given to too 
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many people in a way that is not economically efficient and is ignoring their real cost. 
Considering the firms of the S&P 500 Index, the total amount of stock options given to all the 
employees was estimated to 141 billions USD in 20022. The proportion awarded to the first 
manager represents 4.2% of the grand total, that awarded to the 5 others most important 
managers is 5.3%. It results that 90.5% of the stock options issued in the US will benefit to 
executives and employees. According to Hall and Murphy, the executives and employees’ 
proportion has been increased from 85% of the total, in the years 1990, to more than 90% in 
2002. The large diffusion of stock options in the US firms is also figured out by the number of 
employees who own stock options:  there were 1 million people in 1992, but the figure is 
estimated between 7 and 10 millions in 20003.  
 
The potential equity shares involved by the exercise of stock options plans are also very 
important in the US context. They make the stock options holders an important player, both 
effectively and potentially, in the ownership structure. Hall and Murphy (2003) outline the 
importance of the average annual issued flow of stock options issued by the all the firms from 
the S&P 500 index, the S&P Mid-cap 400 index and the S&P small-cap 600 index during the 
1993-2001 period. This figure is given in percentage of the existing outstanding capital and 
will strongly depend if firms belong to the so-called “New economy” 5.76% or refer to the 
“Old economy”. Even if we consider a firm belonging to a traditional sector of the economy 
who issues annually 2.3% of its capital in stock options, a simple linearization over a 10 years 
period will mean that 23% of his capital will potentially belong to the managers and the 
employees. That share of capital is highly significant in the ownership and could modify the 
structure of power within the firm. 
 
Stock option plans should not be viewed as some percentage of capital punctually given to 
managers, other executives and employees. Stock option plans are annually renewed and take 
place in a long term perspective. More precisely, we know that resetting or replacing plans 
were common when the situation of the firm does not improve or deteriorates, as it was in the 
years 2000. A lot of stock options plans became then very “out of the money” and were 
considered to expire worthless. Resetting the conditions or canceling an existent plan can be 
complex. New cumulative plans set at lower exercise price will then appear to maintain the 
incentive pressure and are stacked with the others. On the other hand, if the economic profit 
of the firm increases, old stock options become “in the money” and new ones are given as a 
reward and to maintain the incentive pressure. These asymmetric dynamic in stock options 
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time process should be underlined (cf. Yermack, 1997 or Ross, 2004). We therefore consider 
that long term stacked and exercised stock option plans will lead to the issue of new stocks 
and will have an ex ante dilutive effect.  
 
It is easier to analyze employee direct stock ownership in the context of a leverage of control. 
The issuance of new stocks modifies the controlling ownership structure. It is pointed out in 
France by Trebucq (2002) who shows that the relative weight of the first shareholders is 
clearly less when a firm developed an employee stock ownership (15.8% of the shares versus 
41.0% for non family firms and 33.3% versus 46.1% considering family firms). For non 
family firms, the leverage of control can represent 35% of the initial stake of the dominant 
shareholder. These empirical complementarities in shareholding support the hypothesis that 
employee stock ownership cumulates itself with the stake of the controlling shareholder. 
 
The theoretical attempt to cross, on the one hand, the economic logics of incentive and 
creation of value, and, on the other hand, the political logic of control, is relatively recent in 
the literature. The “Law and Finance” approach with the important work of La Porta, Lopez 
de Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) propose a first set of answers. They point out that the 
major agency conflict in the firm develops between the dominant shareholder and the other 
outside investors. The long-term logic for the maintenance of control is the access to private 
benefits; so control has an economic value (cf. Shleifer and Vishny, 1986, Zingales, 1995, La 
Porta et al., 1999, Faccio and Lang, 2001, Dyck and Zingales, 2004). The given answers are 
essentially legal ones: rules or regulations, and their enforcement through outside control 
authorities. This approach is based on an exogenous and deterministic relation from the law to 
finance. The political logic within the group of control, the mechanisms of inside regulation 
through internal contracts and auto-regulation of behaviors are not privileged.  
 
Since Jensen and Meckling (1976), the contractual nature of the relationship between the 
different stakeholders who contribute within the firm to the creation of value has been 
highlighted. However, there are only a limited number of analyses on the relationship 
between the control of the firm and the nature of employees’ contracts. Garvey and Gaston 
(1997), as Shleifer and Summers (1998), show that a takeover introduces a change in the 
implicit contract between managers and employees. However, these two studies are based on 
the a priori idea that the ruling managers do have an interest in maintaining the labor contract 
of the employees, and that the initiator of the takeover is interested in canceling it. Gorton and 
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Schmidt (2000) analyze the German context of co-management between employees and 
shareholders, and Gilson and Roe (1999) the Japanese long life employment system. Others 
authors look at the situation of companies held by their employees (Hansmann, 1996). 
Chemla et al. (2004) pay attention to the contractual clauses of the agreements inside the 
group of shareholders to maintain the control. Beside those mentioned, there are only few 
works on the political logic of substitution of shareholder by executives using a leverage of 
control which moreover is crossed with an economic incentive approach.  
 
The theory of incentive focuses on the optimal efforts made by managers or employees in an 
economic logic of shareholders’ value maximization. The literature is particularly developed, 
with the introduction of asymmetry of information, risk aversion or more complex schemes of 
payment. Holmstrom and Milgrom (1994) enlarge the incentive analysis to workers of the 
firm and introduced performance incentives and workers’ ownership of assets. An approach 
in term of joint equilibrium contracts makes things more complex if we introduce 
asymmetries of information. The possibility of a dilution, when awarding discounted stock 
options, is taken in account by shareholders who optimally set a contract aiming at creating an 
additional cash flow resulting from the managers’ efforts. Martin and Thomas (2003) show 
that the positive relationship induced by stock options turns negative for shareholders if we 
take in account the dilutive consequences of massive issues of stocks. Other forms of 
incentive contracts are developed in the employee stock ownership plans framework. For 
instance, a model of optimal incentive contracts is developed by Desbrières (1997b) or La 
Bruslerie and Deffains (2003). Heinrich (2000) analyses the incentive theory applied to 
managers in a firm with a controlling group of shareholders. With an asymmetry of 
information on the real effort function of the managers, the existence of cost of monitoring 
will condition the optimal percentage of ownership by the controlling group.  
 
The global hypothesis of incentive places itself in a clear logic of economic optimization of 
shareholders’ value. The crossed analysis on the relation between the economic optimal 
contracts and the “political” management of the control of the firm are relatively uncommon. 
Pagano and Volpin (2002, 2005) analyze the role of employees helping the controlling group 
of shareholders in the context of a hostile takeover. Their model refers to the incentive 
contracts by looking at the possibility of setting up long term protective labor contracts for the 
employees or to award stock purchasing plans. They also acknowledge the existence of 
private benefits of control and introduce the idea of « white squire », i.e. employees become 
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allied to the managers and the controlling shareholders to defend the firm under attack. Their 
model takes in account an information asymmetry, but it is developed only in a context of a 
defense against a takeover threat. The positive economic effects of the incentive contracts 
awarded to the employees are explicitly ignored in their model. 
 
Only a few numbers of studies were devoted to the enlarged diffusion of stock options in the 
firm, apart those privileging a given institutional approach or a link with strategically 
important events. Dunford et al. (2001) consider that it is not possible to set up a direct 
relation between the employees’ individual performance and the firm’s profitability. Few 
employees (and all the more, shareholders who have less information) can see a direct link 
between their efforts and the stock price movements in the market. This encourages moral 
hazard and opportunism in individual behaviors. Questioning a sample of executives in firms, 
Dunford et al. show that the perception of a direct link is positively related to the situation of 
the executive in the hierarchy. High executives are more involved and stimulated than others. 
We find again the Hall and Murphy’s idea to limit the diffusion of stock options plans to key 
executives in the firm. Conversely, the theories which are justifying enlarged stock options 
plans result from human resources management concepts. The first one states that the absence 
of a direct link between the employees’ performance and the profitability of the firm is not 
true in firms where there are team works and where co-operation is the norm. Individual 
opportunist behaviors are then limited by social pressure. This is particularly true in small 
firms, in those employing people with a strong individual creation power and those in the 
« New economy » and technology sectors. In the US, Sesil et al. (2002) identified firms 
awarding stock options on broad basis plans, particularly in the « New Economy »4. They 
show that broadening stock options to employees has a superior incentive effect and creates 
more value. Another explanation for enlarged stock option plans is the sorting and signaling 
effects for employees outside the firm and wishing to apply for a job. In the labor market, 
employees identify the unambiguous signal of an individual compensation scheme more 
oriented toward performance. The firm will attract those who are aware of their individual 
ability and risk neutral (Oyer et al., 2004). A third explanation for broad issues of stock 
options is the retention hypothesis. Firms will tend to settle employees within the firm by 
increasing for them the cost to leave (Oyer, 2003). 
 
The managerial power hypothesis offers a new approach to understand the process leading to 
jointly agreed stock option contract, which is not the optimal contract imposed by the 
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standard incentive theory that gives the bargaining power to shareholders. The “managerial 
power” approach of Bebchuk and Fried (2003) underlines that the agents have enough power 
to set their own pay. Choe ( 2003) or Ryan and Wiggins (2004) emphasize the importance of 
a bargaining process in designing the compensation scheme in a firm. The “managerial power 
approach” insists on the rent-seeking behavior of managers. They interfere in the design of 
their compensation schemes (Hall and Liebman, 1998; Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001; 
Bebchuk et al., 2002; Jensen and Murphy, 2004). The idea that an informal or implicit 
negotiation process develops within a framework of asymmetry of information has been 
highlighted by Bebchuk and Fried (2003). Contract setting mechanism has also been analyzed 
by Choe (2003) or La Bruslerie and Deffains-Crapsky (2008) with regard to the negotiation of 
stock option plans plans. The managerial self-dealing hypothesis has been documented by 
Sautner and Weber (2006). Considering European firms, they show that firms with weak 
corporate governance and powerful managers have designed stock option programs favorable 
to executives.  
 
Few papers cross the analysis of stock award to both managers and executives, on one side, 
and the management of the controlling group, on the other side. To set the way to a coalition 
contract, we need to complete the traditional incentive theory with a hypothesis of political 
optimization. Our model of leverage of control develops in the context of economic rationale 
for a dominant shareholder to give stocks to managers and employees and to dilute his 
investment. However, the diffusion of stocks to employees, of which efforts are weakly 
productive, has to be explained. Traditionally the effort function of the managers is viewed as 
more productive than the one of the other employees. This is due to the difficulty of setting a 
direct link between the additional effort of a given executive or employee and the increase of 
the whole profit of the firm. 
 
2-The diffusion of stocks to incentivized employees  
 
The model is developed in the context of the “normal” life of the firm without any particular 
contest for the power while we explicitly take in account the effect of incentive contracts in 
the creation of economic value. The best stimulation of managers, executives and employees 
is a traditional and permanent economic goal for the controlling shareholder, as well as 
locking the “political” control over the firm. We want to cross the economic legitimacy of 
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value-oriented decisions by the group of control with the political logic of partial substitution 
of the controlling shareholder by managers and executives. Collusion will help the enlarged 
dominant group to preserve the rent of control. The possibility for a third party (as a hostile 
raider) to break the collusion still exists between managers and dominant shareholder as it 
exists among a controlling group of shareholders. By considering the normal life of the firm, 
this possibility is still an exogenous threat for the dominant group. We will analyze alliance 
within the initial controlling shareholder by looking at a partial substitution of the initial 
shareholder by partners who are awarded new stocks though an ownership plan. So, we start 
by considering a situation where a dominant shareholder already has control over the firm. 
Even if a possibility he/she can be challenged by a third party exists before, the probability of 
a takeover is not modified by the new structure of the dominant controlling group.  
 
The economic problem of the diffusion of stocks through stock awarding plans (or stock 
option plans) within the firm is the one of the optimal level of diffusion according the 
different functions of efforts of the involved actors. The search of leverage in control by a 
mechanism of substitution is simple: the controlling shareholder aims at a lower concentration 
of his wealth in the firm but still wants to exercise the control through a “political” collusion 
with new partners in the controlling group and wants to appropriate private benefits. From a 
portfolio perspective, he/she will profit from a better diversification of his wealth because his 
financial investment in the firm supports a specific risk premium due to concentration. The 
released amount of cash can be invested with a better diversification profit in the market. The 
political desire of politically managing the controlling group results first from a portfolio 
motivation. That one is permanent; we do not need to refer to a specific threat of takeover. 
Even if, for instance, a family group owns more than 50% of the capital, an interest in 
opening the control exists to allow some members to cash their investment in the firm. The 
controlling shareholder is supposed well settled. As a constraint, the setting of a coalition 
contract with others future shareholders should not lead to the loss of control by the new 
controlling group. Maintenance of control by a restructured group of shareholders is 
necessary to avoid a possible takeover. Managing the collusion, the dominant shareholder 
seeks to preserve the larger part of his private benefits while lowering his financial 
participation through leverage of control. The concept of leverage of control means that this 
goal is achieved costlessly if stock ownership goes from the controlling shareholder to 
managers and employees forming a coalition with him. The alliance with managers or 
executives into an enlarged group of control implies sharing the private benefits and more 
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globally implies the negotiation of an implicit coalition contract. The demand for maintenance 
of control and political collusion by the controlling shareholder is well explained by the 
existence of private benefits. We have to justify a possible offer of political alliance by 
managers and others executives. They are interested in the possibility to share a part of these 
private benefits and to “entrench”. If nothing more than a stock ownership is offered, 
managers and others executives will act as simple outside shareholders and not become allied 
of the dominant shareholder. Moreover, suffering from concentration of both their human and 
financial capital in the firm, they will ask a better reward and/or a part of the private benefits. 
We will identify the sharing of private benefits as a variable of the model.  
 
Here, the executives or the employees who are awarded stocks are considered as allied with 
the dominant shareholder. The offer of political collusion by the controlling shareholder 
meets a demand of collusion by the managers/executives. We consider that stimulated 
managers will become members of the group of control. This is usual in private firms where 
managers and shareholders belong to the same family group. It will also happen anywhere if 
only a fraction of the private benefits is given to the new comers in the controlling group. This 
will explain why they become allied, but not why they stay allied. Once the shares are issued, 
we do take into account the mechanisms of sharing the private benefits between the 
controlling shareholder and the new member of the controlling block. That situation will raise 
problem of jointly agreed sharing of the private benefits of control. We do not consider the 
problem of stability of the coalition although the equilibrium may be unstable because the 
sharing of private benefit in an implicit coalition contract will explain the rationale for 
colluding. The long term loyalty of the new members of the controlling group may be 
problematic if a takeover bid arises and particularly if the bid price is attractive. However, we 
consider that the appropriation rate by the controlling group is a perpetuity; it is supposed 
exogenous. It is constrained by the institutional and legal environment aiming at protecting, or 
not, private investors. In coalition with managers and executives, these private benefits are 
shared within the new controlling group. The negotiated percentage λ represents the fraction 
of private benefits retained by the initial controlling shareholder. 
 
It is then interesting to set up incentive mechanisms, either stock option plans, or employee 
stock ownership plans. These two contracts are different. The first one does not imply an 
initial cash-flow paid by the beneficiaries and is a pure purchase options. Stock ownership 
plans entail an initial purchase, often with a discounted price and a subsidy by the employer 
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or the government. This cash flow has to be reinvested in the firm projects. We need then a 
supplementary inside information on the return of the investment projects. On the other side, 
stock options are only potential stocks without the legal rights linked to ownership, 
particularly the right to vote. These options can however be immediately transformed in 
stocks generally after waiting some period of time5. We choose hereafter to develop a stylized 
firm and a stylized contract in a single period model. Among the employees of the firm, we 
consider only two categories of involved actors: managers (subscript t: top managers) and 
executives (subscript m: middle management). Each group is composed with homogeneous 
individuals with identical effort functions expressing their capacity to create an additional 
cash flow. We define e(W) as the raw cash flow gain directly produced by the contract design 
that at equilibrium induces a wealth of W for the manager(executive)6.Their effort functions 
e(.) are strictly increasing with their marginal wealth resulting from the awarded stocks. These 
functions are different between the two stakeholders groups. The individual efforts will result 
in a perpetual increase f( ) in the economic cash flow. What matters here is that the 
distribution of new shares gives immediate voting rights or easily exercisable voting rights, 
rebalancing effectively the ownership structure. What imports also is that, at the same time, 
the setting of the contract develops an immediate creation of value through an effort function. 
We consider a stock awarding plan in a one period framework. We do not want the initial 
cash-flow payment of the stocks to appear because it would question the internal rate of return 
of new investment projects in the firm. Here, a stock awarding plan leads to the issuance of 
new stocks belonging to managers and executives. In case of stock options, the dominant 
shareholder considers that the exercise of the options is certain and considers the new 
structure of ownership. The stock awarding plan can be viewed as a stylized stock purchase 
plan or stock option plan. It corresponds to a stock ownership plan with either a null purchase 
price or a long-term deferred payment if the purchase price is not zero7. It corresponds also to 
a stock options contract, the exercise of which is considered as certain and immediate. The 
stock option contract, where the exercise is certain, is in fact equivalent to a stock ownership 
plan with no initial cash flow. For instance, this is the case if the stock options are set with a 
null exercise price or if stock options are immediately exercisable but with a deferred 
payment of the exercise price. This stylized generic contract is called stock awarding plan and 
covers features of both stock ownership and stock options plans8. 
 
We set: 
X0: economic profit of the firm (supposed to be perpetuity) 
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r: risk adjusted valuation rate used by the controlling shareholders. It may be greater than the 
risk adjusted cost of capital in the market because of their wealth under-diversification. 
Wt, Wm,Wc :respectively, managers, middle executive and controlling shareholder s’ wealth 
N: initial number of shares 
kt, km: number of new shares created, respectively, for managers and middle executives, 
expressed in percentage of the existing number of shares 
ft, fm: individual cash flow gain resulting from an individual effort by, respectively, a manager 
and a middle executive  
nt, nm: numbers of managers and executives involved in incentive contracts 
α: share of capital belonging to the initially controlling shareholder 
s: share of the economic profit directly appropriated by the controlling group. 
λ: part of the private benefits retained by the initial controlling investors. Managers and others 
executives will receive (1-λ)% of the private benefits. 
 
We introduce an asymmetry of information: the controlling shareholder does not know with 
certainty the shape of the individual effort function of the managers and the executives and 
the resulting increase in cash flow. Individual efforts results in an increase in cash flow  e(.) 
ensuing from stimulated managers or executives. The slope of effort functions of both 
managers t and executives will depend on the utility of their additional wealth, here W. Their 
utility is strictly increasing with wealth and their effort too. Increases in cash flow come from 
best efforts, productivity improvement or better decisions. However, economic uncertainty 
makes the size of the increase in cash flow not deterministic but uncertain even to the 
managers and executives. They are risk averse in setting their equilibrium effort because they 
bear an economic uncertainty on the final productivity output of their best efforts. We have: 
  tmtmtm WeWee ,,, )()(~(.)~ ε+==        (1) 
with εm,t a white noise with standard deviation σm,t. We stipulate that the incentive result, i.e. 
the individual gain of cash flow e(.) is increasing with wealth (may be at a decreasing pace). 
The firm profits from an increase in cash-flow but supports some new costs. The managers’ 
efforts are less and less productive, monitoring costs appears. The cost function is c(.). The 
cash-flow increase is a function of both the individual effort function and a cost function 
linked to the manager(executive)’s increase in wealth, such that f() = e(.) – c(.). Any 
functional form f(.) may be a good candidate, but we want an incentive optimum to exist from 
the shareholder’s point of view. It leads to an optimal economic incentive of managers and 
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executives whose action converges to the optimum finite effort. This individual increase cash 
flow shows a maximum which means that at a certain point the incentive efforts are balanced 
by negative externalities. The negative cost function is usually set quadratic in the literature. 
What is important is not the level, but the slope of the cash flow gain function f(.) and many 
functional form could have been accepted leading to the condition of a finite W*9. For a given 
wealth incentive W, the gain of cash flow is assumed to be higher for a manager than for a 
middle executive: ft> fm.  
 
The exercise of the option or stock purchase with a null price is certain from the beneficiaries’ 
point of view. The stimulated managers and executives have superior information to set their 
effort considering. The outcome of their decision is uncertain and they are risk averse because 
of the uncertainty on their other economic choices. We consider that the exercise is immediate 
at the inception of the plan. From the controlling shareholder’s side, risk aversion should also 
be taken in account because he/she faces an uncertain gain in cash flow resulting from the 
effort functions of the managers or the executives. Moreover, he does not know the effort 
function which is personal and private information of the managers and the executives and 
can only forecast it, and the induced monitoring costs, with error. The risk here is to guess 
how much managers are incentivized in a situation of asymmetry of information. It is linked 
with the unknown slope of the incentive function. Because the later are insiders in the firm 
they know how much their effort will increase the cash-flow. In our model, the only 
uncertainty that the initial controlling shareholder faces is the exact amount of gains in cash 
flows. The risk-averse initial controlling shareholder only knows with imperfection that effort 
function. His own optimization calculus is based on a forecasted cash flow gain f*(.). He 
guesses it with a larger random noise σc.> σm,t. We suppose that both controlling shareholder 
and managers have an exponential utility function (µ: risk aversion coefficient):  
U(W)=1 - exp(-µW)          (2) 
 
3-The setting of a collation with managers 
In this section, we consider that new stocks are only awarded to managers.  
 
1) Situation of the controlling shareholder 
We start from an initial situation of control by the dominant shareholder who has a stake of 
the capital that is the minimum stake of capital to control the firm, α010. There are k.N new 
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shares issued toward the managers and the initially controlling shareholder has α.N shares. 
The initial stake has to be optimized. We want to know the new optimal participation rate α* 
for the dominant shareholder after the issue of the stock option plan. Then, considering the 
new controlling group composed by the dominant shareholder and the managers, the held 
share of capital will be: (α+kt)/(1+kt). The initially controlling shareholder forecasts the 
unknown individual gain of effort f* made by each manager with a random noise ε. This one 
has a zero mean and a standard deviation, σc.  
 ctt ff ε~(.)*(.)
~
+=          (3) 
The expected value of the individual expected cash flow is then unbiased: E(ε)=0. The 
dominant shareholder’s wealth before the stock awarding plan is: 
r
sXsXWc
)1(000 −+
=
α
. 
After awarding stocks, the controlling shareholder holds a new stake α which need to be 
optimized. This new stake generates profit which adds to the fraction λ of private benefits he 
appropriates. His/her wealth also increased because he/she sold a fraction (α0-α) of his/her 
initial stake just before awarding new stocks to managers11. It becomes: 
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His gain compared with his initial wealth is: 
[ ])1(~)1()1)(1()1(~)1( 1~ 00 sfnksXksXksfnrkG tttttttc −+−−+−−++= ααλλ  (5) 
The dominant shareholder is risk averse and considers the certainty equivalent CE of his 
uncertain increase in wealth: 
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A participation constraint (PC) should be set for the controlling shareholder. It outlines that 
he/she is involved only if a net creation of value compensates the dilution of the economic 
cash flow and the risk they suffer. The condition for an additional certainty equivalent 
positive value results from (6). The expected gain in cash-flow ensuing from managers’ 
efforts should respect the condition: 
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This condition collapses into 220 )1(2
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t
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+>  only if s is null, i.e. if there is 
no private appropriation.  
 
Looking at relation (6) and setting the CE derivative versus α to zero in order to set the first 
order condition, we get the optimal ownership for the dominant shareholder: 
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The derivative of the optimal ownership for the dominant shareholder (i.e. eq. 7) versus k 
shows a possible substitution in capital between the controlling shareholder and the managers: 
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The sign of (8) is a priori undetermined. Three terms of (8) out of four are negative. 
Compared with a situation without private benefits we remark that the sign of (8) is less 
negative because the last term between brackets vanishes. Moreover, in most cases, the size of 
the current economic profit X0 compared to the additional cash-flow ntft* lets envisage a 
negative sign. The variable α* is a quadratic function of k. It gives the locus of ownership 
rates from the dominant shareholder according the opening of capital to the managers. The 
equation (7) has two roots in the plane (k, α*). One is negative (k=-1) and is meaningless. The 
other root is 0
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−= σµλ ; it gives a positive intercept on the x-axis. We 
eliminate possibilities such that kn
r
sfn cttt 221* σµλ 
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value at point 0
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For stock awarding plans of which gains of effort are relatively low compared to the 
economic profit of the firm (i.e. giving a negative sign to equation (8), or more largely if 
ntft*<X0), the relation between α* and k is strictly decreasing. We are in an economic logic of 
substitution of the controlling shareholder by managers. The more the dominant shareholder 
opens the firm’s capital, the more he suffers from a certain dilution of the economic profit and 
the more he is exposed to the risk of an uncertain future profitability because he forecasts with 
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noise a more important part of the future global cash flow. The dominant shareholder is then 
led to reduce his participation.  
 
From equation (7), for k=0, and after some manipulation, we get: 
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disappears. Then managers have a share of capital in percentage relatively to N that is lower 
or equal to the ratio of the gain in cash flow produced by their effort divided by the current 
economic profit of the firm. Looking at figure 1, the incentive curve AC of the optimal stock 
awarding plans is decreasing between the point A defined by α*0 and the point C where 
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Proposition 1 : For the sufficient condition ntft*<X0(1+2kt), the derivative dα/dk is negative.  
 
It means that setting an optimal incentive for managers leads to a negative relation between 
the optimal share of capital held by the initially dominant shareholder and the share of capital 
issued toward the managers. This negative relation will initiate an economic logic of incentive 
allowing a substitution effect of capital ownership within the controlling group. Ceteris 
paribus, a context of appropriation of private benefit by the controlling shareholder will help 
to make dα/dk more negative (see eq. 8). It adds an economic motivation to a substitution in 
stock ownership between colluding parties.  
 
If we can identify a rationale of substitution in the firm’s capital between dominant 
shareholders and managers, does that economic logic meet the political logic of control? The 
reduction of the under-diversification cost for the controlling shareholder and the perspective 
of sharing a part of the private benefits for the new shareholders may explain a rationale of 
substitution in the capital held by the dominant shareholder with the shares awarded to the 
managers. Then, we are in a setting of a political collusion with well-stimulated managers 
who become members of the controlling group. The control will be maintained by a group 
composed with the dominant shareholder and well-stimulated managers becoming 
shareholders through a stock awarding plan. The condition for control (CC) is that a decrease 
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of the share α of the dominant investor should not entail a loss of control by the controlling 
group, knowing that the initial control threshold is α0: 
 01
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α
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That condition results in a negatively sloped line defining a sub-space in the plane (k,α): 
 α* > α0 - kt(1 - α0)        (CC1) 
A “condition of control” is introduced in the model expressing a relationship between the 
share of capital belonging to the initial controlling shareholder and the number of new shares 
created by the ownership plan, where the level of control remains constant. This defines an 
“iso-control” border line. The line corresponding to a coalition setting and a shared control 
situation; it cuts the x-axis at point α0/(1-α0) and the y-axis at point α0. Equation (7) gives a 
decreasing curve (1) in the plane (k, α*) which corresponds to the locus of economically 
optimal stock awarding plans. Incentive effects are described as an “iso-wealth” line for the 
controlling shareholder in the space of ownership shares of controlling shareholders and size 
of the ownership plan.  
 
We will consider four cases. In the first two we consider situations where the initial control 
threshold is above the actual stake of capital which is economically justified: 
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α . The stake of capital of the initial controlling shareholder is set 
equal to α0. That starting situation does clearly lead to develop an economically rationale of 
managers’ incentive by opening the capital without political alliance. The opening of capital 
may nevertheless bring interesting perspectives if a large substitution effect develops in a new 
coalition group and if a double economic and political justification appears at some point. 
This is not always the case. In the last two cases, we consider that the reverse is true (i.e. α0 
below the initial starting point to develop economically an incentive), it means that the stake 
of the initial controlling shareholder is not in itself enough to initiate a rationale of economic 
incentive. He should consider at the same time awarding shares to managers in a rationale of 
political alliance. The four different cases are illustrated in figure 1 and explained below. 
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, the line of control (a) is 
above the curve of optimal economic incentive stock awarding contract (1). The 
political logic of holding control precludes to lower too much the stake of capital 
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held by the new shareholder coalition. There are no joint economic and political 
solutions. 
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control (b) also cuts the curve of stock awarding optimal plans. Only the segment 
EC corresponds to the admissible choices. This segment implies everywhere a 
partial substitution of the dominant shareholder by the managers in the controlling 
group. 
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control (c) cuts the curve of the stock option optimal plans. The domain of the 
incentive stock options is limited first to the segment AD of the curve. A choice 
taken on the segment DC does not allow satisfying the condition of joint control. 
The segment AB may mean an increase of ownership by the dominant shareholder 
if his initial stake was set at the rational limit of the iso-control line, α0. His goal is 
to reduce his financial participation; so the admissible choices are given by the 
segment BD.  
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control (d) is always below the iso-wealth contract curve (1). Any optimally 
incentive solutions are then compatible with the maintenance of a joint control. The 
optimal incentive of the managers is certain for the values of k located between 0 
and the limit point C. Considering the AB segment of curve, the couple of values of 
the choice between the opening of the capital and the stake of the dominant 
shareholder implies an ownership above α0. It would mean an increase of his 
financial investment in the firm. Conversely, a choice on the segment BC entails a 
decrease in the participation of the initial controlling shareholder in the firm’s 
capital. 
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 Figure 1 – Logic of substitution between dominant shareholder and managers 
 
Considered from the dominant shareholder’s point of view, it may exist admissible choices 
compatible with the maintenance of control if α0<A or if α0/(1-α0)<C (insuring we are in case 
(b), (c) or (d)). The respect of one of these conditions is easy if α0 is low and/or if e* is high 
which means a highly productive function of effort. The systematic evidence of a substitution 
corresponds to the case (d), which means the joint respect of the two inequalities α0 > A and 
α0/(1-α0) < C. We remark that the joint satisfaction is made easy with a high value for nt, what 
means a high diffusion of stock options among numerous managers.  
 
Proposition 2: The distribution of new stocks to a group of optimally incentivized managers 
(see proposition 1) leads to a partial substitution of the dominant shareholder by the formers 
in the controlling group. There are cases (cases (b), (c) or (d) in the above developments) 
where the two logics of economic incentive and political collusion between the dominant 
shareholder and the managers are strictly coherent and go in the same direction. 
 
2) Managers’ wealth after granting stock options 
The global wealth of the managers cumulates a part of private benefits and a stake of capital 
taking into account an increase in the issued number of shares. They value the perpetuities 
using the same discounting rate that the controlling shareholder12: 
k 
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(c) 
D 
A 
 
(d) (1) (a) 
α* 
α0 
Initial control stake 
case (c) and (d) 
α0 Initial control stake 
case (a) and (b) 
C 
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The managers are risk averse and consider the certainty equivalent CE of their uncertain 
increase in wealth with a noise σt: 
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The condition for an additional certainty equivalent positive value results from (6). The 
managers want to maximize their wealth. They should optimize their individual effort and set 
dECt/d(1-λ) to zero. Thus from (10) the optimal sharing of the private benefit for the mangers 
is: 
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We see from (11) that (1-λt)* has an inverse relationship with kt13. In the managers’ demand 
curve a trade-off appears between awarding stocks and enjoying a part of private benefits. We 
are in a joint political/economical contract. Negotiating their participation to the new 
coalition, the managers will ask for a share of private benefits. This parameter is free and 
depends on the power relationship. In the managerial power approach (Bebchuk et al., 2003) 
managers will also ask for a certain stake of capital. There exist an infinity of optimal 
contracts from their point of view in the plane (k, λ) given by the curve (11). Private benefit 
will help an increasing curve to emerge. For managers, it would mean a trade-off relationship 
between the part of private benefits they earn from belonging to the new controlling group 
and the stake of awarded capital. Equation (11) can have no admissible solution for k. We will 
hereafter suppose an optimal solution kt* locus exists which is admissible for the managers14. 
 
3) Sharing the private benefits and coalition contract 
A joint contract between managers and the initial controlling shareholder to collude in a new 
controlling group is designed through the two variables k and λ. From (7), we get the derivate 
of α* with regard to the shared part of private benefit kept by the initial controlling 
shareholder: 
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The percentage of capital withheld by the initial controlling shareholder decreases if the part 
of private benefits he/she appropriates himself is important. This is a strong incentive to lower 
his participation stake (reducing the over-investment of his wealth in the firm) and, at the 
same type, by asking to be paid relatively more with private benefits. The optimal private 
benefits sharing in the coalition from the initial shareholder point of view is: 
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The first order condition is: 
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So, ( )2)1()1(*sgn*sgn ctt nskrf σµαλ −−+= . Looking at the derivatives, we get dλ*/dk>0 
and dλ*/ds>0. It means that the initial controlling shareholder is willing to exchange an 
important share of capital with managers if he/she can get a higher share of private benefits. 
The negotiation between the managers and the initial controlling shareholders defines a 
contract of coalition sharing private benefits and defining the relative percentage within the 
new controlling group. 
 
Finding equilibrium in the coalition group relies on the design of a three variables set: the 
share of capital held by the initial controlling shareholder, α, their appropriated fraction of 
private benefits, λ and the awarded share of capital k. The initial controlling shareholder 
contract setting follows both equations (7) and (14). He/she has a non biased but uncertain 
view of the individual new cash flow resulting from the incentivized managers, et*. The 
optimal contract curve for managers is given by relation (11). The later does not refer to α, 
which is not their problem. It defines an increasing curve in the (k, λ) plane.  
 
For a given α* value, the initial shareholder curve is increasing. The two curves (11) and (14) 
converge to different values as k increases and have positive slopes. So they cross and define 
a unique joint equilibrium coalition contract. To get an admissible solution the contract terms 
should correspond to values of λ between 0 and 100% and to “reasonable” values for k. We 
call kmax the maximum issue of new shares admissible for the initial shareholder’s point of 
view. He/she accepts to form a coalition but not to be diluted in the new controlling group. 
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The ratio of his participation in α/(α+k). He/she has a limited target value for k. For instance 
if he wants to remain a major player in the coalition he will set kmax=α. We define a rectangle 
of admissible values in the (k, λ) plane. If the two contract curves cross in the admissible 
values surface, the setting of an optimal coalition contract is straightforward (see figure 2, 
Dominant shareholder-case a curve). 
 
  Figure 2 – Setting of the coalition contract  
 
 
If the two curves cross outside the admissible solutions rectangle (case (b) in Figure 2), the 
solution of a coalition contract is unstable or uncertain. Incentive may be awarded but no cake 
sharing is proposed in a new controlling group. No political coalition alliance is agreed. The 
solution by definition should be located on the managers’ curve (f=f* in the dominant 
shareholder’s problem). If the curves cross outside the rectangle, a corner solution will hold 
with λ=1 (i.e. no private benefits given to managers) and the corresponding (on managers’ 
curve) k offered for incentive reasons. This solution is suboptimal for the dominant 
shareholder. A stability problem may arise if kmax were so low that the corresponding λ on the 
managers’ curve is lower than 1. In this case the large shareholder can propose a contract with 
(kmax , λ (kmax)) belonging to the managers’ curve (i.e. choose the point where the difference 
between the two curves is minimized). Obviously if the large shareholder is in control of 
private benefits and is in the position of excluding the managers from enjoying them, a 
commitment problem arises because, at kmax, his preferred λt is higher than λ(kmax)). But this 
λ 
100% 
Managers  
Dominant shareholder case a 
Dominant shareholder case b 
σc 
k 
kmax 
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will also destroy incentives15. Case (b) is economically suboptimal either for the dominant 
shareholder or the managers. 
 
A convergence is possible within the admissible rectangle through a joint negotiation process. 
The solution is in the hand of the managers who may give insurances and deliver private 
information. Asymmetry of information between the two parties results in a white noise for 
the shareholder who have only a guess f* of the increase in value resulting from the incentive. 
If the managers gives trustable information on e, the standard deviation σc will lower and 
consecutively the initial shareholder’s equilibrium relationship (14) moves down and may 
cross equation (11) (see Dominant shareholder-case b curve in figure 2). The solution is also 
in the hand of the dominant shareholder who can play on the variable n, i.e. the number of 
managers who are awarded stocks. If the initial crossing point is above kmax, it is possible to 
limit the number of “happy fews” managers. The managers’ curve will then move to the left 
and may cross within the admissible rectangle solutions. A negotiation process may develop 
which results in a delivery of private information and/or a political management of the 
coalition group by setting its size.  
 
This negotiation process within the coalition results in an agreed sharing of the private 
benefits, λ*. We remark that the sharing rule has absolutely no reason to follow the relative 
shareholding proportion. A proportional sharing would mean λ*=α/(α+k), i.e. private benefit 
are shared according the relative proportion of shares in the new dominant group. This 
proportional sharing rule, if followed, would overdetermine the problem and may results in no 
optimal joint solution. We see that the existence of private benefits make thing easier to agree 
an optimal leverage of control. Without any private benefits, the optimal capital stake 
accepted by managers reduces to an optimal economic incentive problem without any reason 
for the coalition to remain stable. In a framework of private benefits, an optimal economic 
incentive of managers and a substitution of ownership in a new controlling group will result 
in joint optimal values to share the private benefits and to set the percentage of newly issued 
capital. This defines a coalition contract. 
 
Proposition 3: A process of negotiation based on the delivery of private information by 
managers and/or a political management of the size of the new controlling group may lead to 
converge to a unique and joint coalition contract. 
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Proposition 4: Compared with a situation without private benefits, the sharing of private 
benefits in a coalition contract between an initial controlling shareholder and stock awarded 
managers makes easier the existence of joint and stable coalition equilibrium and helps 
developing an economical and political logic of leverage of control.  
 
4-The setting of a coalition with managers and executives 
The previous results can be extended if another group of employees, for instance executives, 
can be economically incentivized and may join a new controlling group. 
 
1) General framework 
We begin by analyzing the general framework of a dominant shareholder looking for 
collusion with two groups of stimulated employees. His wealth resulting from the joint 
distribution of stocks to top managers (t) and to middle executives (m) is: 
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The increase of wealth compared with the initial situation before the two stock awarding plans 
is : 
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Considered from the dominant shareholder’s point of view, the uncertainties resulting from 
the individual gains of effort from managers and executives are supposed identical and 
perfectly correlated16. This hypothesis avoids separating the random noises εc and the standard 
deviation σc resulting from the individual gains of effort, with regard to the two categories of 
actors. The certainty equivalent of the increase of wealth for the dominant shareholder 
depends on his uncertain information: 
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We find again a participation condition of creation of value, which insures a global incentive 
from the controlling shareholders to issue a stock awarding plan. 
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That incentive constraint is weaker than the one restricted to managers (PC1). It allows 
getting, on the one hand, a large creation of value at the latter’s level and, on the other hand, 
weakly productive stocks awarding plans at the executives’ level. What is important is the 
global incentive constraint (PC2) to be satisfied. This condition is satisfied, for instance, even 
if (nmfm* - kmX0) is negative. This corresponds to the net difference between the value added 
by the executives in the cash-flow (which may even be negative) and the dilution of the 
economic initial profit due to the stake of capital awarded to executives. Poorly stimulated, 
weakly efficient and/or very numerous middle executives can be awarded a relatively 
important number of stocks compared to their contribution to the creation of cash flow. It can 
happen in situation where managers have a very efficient effort function and are very 
productive in term of additional cash flow. 
 
By setting to zero the derivative of equation (17) with regard to α, we get the optimal 
participation rate for the dominant shareholder after issuing the two stock awarding plans: 
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The sign of the derivative of α* with regard to the global awarded percentage of capital, 
(kt+km), is: 
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The sign of the relation (19) stays negative if the total gain of cash flow is lower than the 
magnitude of the three other terms of the RHS of (19) For instance, a total gain of cash flow 
lower than the initial economic profit of the firm (i.e. (ntft*+nmfm*)<X0) is a sufficient 
condition to insure a negative relation between the stake of capital to newcomers in the 
controlling group and the participation of the initially controlling shareholder. The 
substitution between α and (kt+km) gives a decreasing curve for the optimal economic 
contracts in the plane (k, α*), where k is now the total fraction of capital awarded to both 
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managers and executives. This curve intercepts the x-axis at the value 
0
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plane (k, α) compared to the situation where the stock option plan was restricted only to 
managers (if fm(.) is positive, i.e. if the efforts made by the executives are at the least 
productive). 
 
The intercept with the y-axis is located at:  
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If we compare with the intercept in the situation of stock plans only limited to managers, 
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Remembering the hypothesis ft>fm, we obtain: 
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For non zero values of nm, we have: 
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As a consequence, the curve of incentive stock awarding plans enlarged to both managers and 
executives always cuts that one only limited to managers (for positive fm(.)). We show that a 
substitution in ownership between the dominant shareholder and executives is effective with 
enlarged stock awarding plans if the sign of equation (19) is negative. Nevertheless, the 
economic optimal substitution is less effective for more widely distributed plans. The 
incentive gains are marginally lower (fm<ft) and dilution on a larger number of stocks is 
certain. Moreover, the dominant shareholder is exposed to a more important estimation risk 
on the future additional cash flow: the uncertainty on the gains of effort resulting from 
managers and executives cumulates. It follows that the slope of the curve (18) of the optimal 
stock awarding plans is weaker in the plane (k, α*). 
 
In the context of collusion between the dominant shareholder and, on the other side, managers 
and executives in a controlling group, the condition for maintaining the control (CC) is:  
 α* > α0 - (kt+km).(1-α0)       (CC2) 
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This inequality gives a border line which position in the plane (kt+km, α*) is unchanged 
compared with the alliance with only managers. The difference is that the former opening of 
the capital offered to only managers is now split between managers and executives. The 
maximum value of the opening rate of the capital α0/(1-α0) will now limit the number of 
stocks awarded to both managers and executives. Figure 3 shows the new situation of a 
substitution which, at the same time, is economically stimulating and maintains a control on 
the firm. The shift of the upper part of the curve below the line of control is a direct function 
of the diffusion of stocks to the executives, nm. Such a situation leads to a systematic 
substitution of ownership in the controlling group where both the economic logic of incentive 
and a political leverage of control act in the same direction for the initial dominant 
shareholder. The enlarged possibilities of choices of optimal stock options plans is given by 
the segment AB which replaces the segment CD of the curve of choices only limited to 
managers. This extension gives more discretionary power to the dominant shareholder. It is 
allowed by the existence of positive gains of effort from executives (fm>0) and by the 
distribution of options to many stimulated people. From the dominant shareholder’s point of 
view, the logic of a large substitution in ownership both allows the maintenance of the control 
and can be economically efficient.  
 
We remember that the optimal incentive of managers and executives needs also to satisfy two 
demand equations similar to (11) which express a desire to get stocks and to participate in the 
capital. The solution (kt+km)opt has an higher value than the share of capital asked by the only 
managers, ktopt. The final joint equilibrium is more on the left and corresponds to a larger 
diffusion of capital to executives and therefore in a logic of substitution, to a lower share of 
direct ownership α* by the dominant shareholder. 
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Figure 3 – Substitution equilibrium with stock options limited to managers and opened to 
managers and executives 
 
Proposition 5: The search of an economic equilibrium with a set of globally efficiently 
incentivized employees in the firm can be totally compatible with a logic of substitution of 
ownership in a controlling group even if an enlarged category of beneficiaries whose efforts 
are weakly productive is involved. 
 
2) Case of executives with inefficient effort functions  
Is there an economic logic to diffuse stock options even if the beneficiaries cannot produce 
any additional cash flow? This question does not refer only to the situation of non-stimulated 
executives whose effort function is null, but also to the problem of non-observable effort 
functions. The difficulty, for the controlling shareholder when setting stock awarding plans, is 
to make a link between the distribution of stocks and the additional cash flow resulting from 
the effort of the beneficiaries. If the effort function is not observable, the situation viewed for 
the controlling shareholder is the same as if the beneficiaries are inefficient.  
 
Here we suppose that, on the average, the dominant shareholder knows that the efforts made 
by the middle executives are not productive (or not observable) : E[fm(.)]=0. Maybe some 
executives can be effectively stimulated and can produce an additional individual cash flow, 
others are not, and some will entrench because their individual behavior is not observable. 
managers 
managers + executives 
A 
B 
D 
C 
ktopt  (kt+km)opt 
α* 
kt, kt+km 
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The average is null. For the dominant shareholder, the individual uncertainty remains with a 
standard deviation σc around the null expected individual cash flow. The shareholders, when 
enlarging a stock awarding plan to executives, are then in a situation where their marginal 
gain is zero, although they support a risk of estimation and a certain dilution. The previous 
conclusions should be modified because it is now economically useless to set up an enlarged 
stock awarding plan. The whole curve of incentive stock plans moves downward. The 
intercept with the x-axis remains identical to the one of the situation of stock awarding plans 
restricted to only managers, so: 0
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(point C, 
figure 4).  
 
When considering equation (20), the intercept with the y-axis shifts down rapidly because it is 
an inverse function of the squared value of nm. The more the diffusion to inefficient agents is 
large in the firm, the more it is economically irrational to justify the award to many people. In 
any case, substitution is weaker. The enlarged diffusion of stocks entails a general dilution of 
the wealth produced by the managers that depends on the opening rate of the capital km of 
which the executives will benefit. The enlarged distribution to inefficient agent creates a 
windfall profit for those who appropriate a part of the economic profit created by the 
managers. The economic optimality of these plans is lower for the shareholder. If nm (and thus 
km) is too important, the diffusion is too large and the curve of economically incentive 
contracts shifts below the line of control. This happens particularly if, beside, we have 
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situation, we do not get any admissible enlarged stock awarding plan because the entire curve 
is then located below the control line. If conversely 
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> (α0/(1-α0)), the intercept with the x-
axis is more on the left of the minimum control line. The curve of economically incentive 
stock option plans cuts the control line in a point which is also located more on the left. Then, 
it is still justified both economically and in term of control to set up enlarged stock awarding 
plans, although the goal of a better incentive has no sense for a sub-category of inefficient 
beneficiaries. The necessary condition is that the other beneficiaries are efficiently stimulated 
and create important individual gains of cash flow.  
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The search of a pure logic of substitution can be to lower the curve of the optimal stock 
awarding plans which then can easily be located below the initial share of ownership α0. 
Figure 4 shows, for a given demand of plans from the managers, kt*, that lowering the curve 
allows initiating an easier logic of substitution in the group of control. The optimal joint 
equilibrium (point A) before an enlarged diffusion to the executives entails an increase in the 
share of capital of the dominant shareholder which is by definition the opposite of the sought-
after substitution. The new curve, below the previous one, leads to the double and coherent 
logic of economic optimization of incentive and of political optimization of control through 
leverage. The joint solution given by the point B is located below the line corresponding to 
the α0 ordinate. It means a decrease in ownership and a leverage of control for the dominant 
shareholder.  
 
 Figure 4 – Situation of executives with inefficient efforts 
 
The research of a pure leverage of control based on a large offer of new stocks to many 
executives or employees can be justified although they will not be economically incited to 
create more value. The global economic incentive is weaker, but the first goal for the 
dominant shareholder is to lower his participation and what matters is that there are enough 
incited and productive managers to make the logic of substitution of the dominant shareholder 
economically valid. The incentive condition to be satisfied is then: [ntft*-(kt+km)X0] > 0. In 
that framework, the logic is first a political substitution in the controlling group conditioned 
by a global economic constraint.  
ktopt 
α0 
A 
B 
α* 
C 
(kt+km) 
 32 
 
The difficulty, then, is the allocation of the new stocks between the managers and the 
executives. The research of an optimal incentive will lead to follow a distribution which best 
stimulates each ones’ efforts. The respect of the equation (5) allows identifying the asked 
optimal share of capital according to the marginal effort. If fm=0, the share of capital 
economically justified for the executives, km, should be zero. It follows that all the shares 
awarded in an enlarged stock awarding plan should be allocated to the managers who are 
creating all the additional value. We are then in a contradiction between the economic logic of 
best incentive, which lead to exclude the executives from the award of stocks, and the 
political logic of a large substitution by a strong leverage of control. If km is not zero, the 
managers are not in a situation corresponding to their optimized effort function and resulting 
an additional individual cash flow ft*. With kt<ktopt, they produce a gain ft<ft*. The point C in 
figure 4 (equal to ntft/X0) will move on the left and can lead easily to a shift of the curve of the 
sub-optimal contracts below the control line. As a consequence, a non zero value for km, in a 
situation of inefficient executives, makes more difficult the achievement of a logic of 
substitution by an enlarged plan of stock options. There, the decision for the dominant 
shareholder is a trade-off between economic and political logics which do not lead to 
compatible and optimal choices. His decision will be economically non-optimal for any 
significant allocation of new stocks to inefficient executives. 
 
Is it possible to develop a political logic of substitution in ownership with non cash flow 
productive or stimulated executives? We can push further the argument for a political logic of 
substitution through an enlarged stock awarding plan given to inefficient executives (or 
employees). The idea is to optimize the trade-off between the political goal and the economic 
optimality. The dominant shareholder can promote such an enlarged plan while he perfectly 
knows that the distribution of new stocks will not create any additional observable cash flow 
(an additional cash flow is possible but it cannot be attributed to the executives’ efforts). He is 
then in a context of certainty, with no incentive behavior from the supposedly inefficient 
effort of executives. The dominant shareholder knows that the executives will create no 
additional cash flow fm(.)=017. The incentive is true for the managers and false for the 
executives. Then, the dominant shareholder is not exposed to any estimation risk σ about the 
latter because he/she has no doubt on their behavior18. He privileges cynicism. He refuses to 
investigate, or to explicit, the creation of value from middle executives and employees even if 
it is non-null. The cost to reveal individual performance in a team or in a department may be 
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high enough to justify such an attitude. The only remaining risk for the dominant shareholder 
results from the effort function of the stimulated managers. The certainty equivalent of the 
shareholder’s wealth (17) simplifies. Particularly, we remark that the risk premium is lower: 
in that sense, cynicism is rational here because it improves the welfare of the dominant 
shareholder in a situation of non-efficient (or non identifiable) efforts from the executives.  
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We get: 
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Looking at the optimal shareholding for the dominant investor (eq. 22), we see that we are in 
the same situation as the one limited to only managers (see equation (10)). For the reasons 
already exposed above, the economic rational allocation of stocks awarding should be only 
for those with a productive function of effort; then km=0. Any diffusion of stocks to 
executives will be economically sub-optimal and will weaken the leverage of control19.  
 
However, the contradiction between a “political” enlarged diffusion of stocks and the best 
economical stimulation can be partially raised if we consider in equation (22) that α*, the 
optimal ownership of the initial dominant shareholder, does not refer to the number of 
executives who are given new stocks. So, the value of nm can be very large. We can then 
envisage a “political” management of the leverage of control by awarding to the managers a 
share of the capital very close to the one that leads to their best economic incentive (kt≈ kt*); 
the share given to the executives being very small or negligible (km≈0). In the same time, the 
beneficiaries will be very numerous. We are led to a symbolic management of stocks 
distribution in the firm with high nm and low km. At the limit, a generalized distribution of 
stocks to the firm’s employees, but in very small individual quantity, is politically meaningful 
and economically acceptable.  
 
A symbolic policy of stock awarding in order to create a leverage of control should however 
be at least compatible with enough productive efforts made by some categories of agents of 
the firm in order to respect the economic incentive rationale. A purely political coalition with 
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everybody implies some welfare costs due to the non-efficient (or non-recognizable) efforts of 
some categories of employees. They are given a rent which is paid by the shareholder who 
accepts a dilution and the agents whose efforts are highly productive but not well paid.  
 
The political-economical trade-off seems here to be sub-optimal in term of economic welfare. 
But, we show that this “cost” can be politically managed and limited. Moreover, we should 
take in account the fact that political cynicism leads the manager to the same risk premium as 
in the case of stock awarding limited to only productive managers. This question has 
important consequences if we consider the problem of observability. May be executives have 
poorly efficient functions of effort creating a small additional cash flow? Ex post, the firm 
will only observe a global increase in cash flow. However, it does not have ex ante forecasts 
of individual performance. If the cost to set up a system of objective individual performance 
attribution is very high (or impossible), it is worthless to “invest” in the incentive of 
employees. It is therefore rational to follow a symbolic management of incentive contracts 
looking for a larger coalition in a new controlling group without departing too much from the 
economic optimality. The conjunction of the economic rationality of incentive and the 
political logic of a leverage of control is possible. Even in a situation where some agents have 
non-productive (or non-observable) functions of effort, it is rational to propose enlarged stock 
awarding plans. The political and symbolic management of the group of control appears then 
as the first goal.  
 
The enlarged distribution of new stocks to numerous executives for symbolic individual 
quantities allows, even if their effort functions are non-productive (or non-observable), to 
develop a mechanism of leverage of control that remains compatible with the economic 
incentive of highly productive managers. However, the substitution in ownership develops in 
a trade-off where the best optimal incentive goal is dominated by the political logic of 
collusion.  
 
Conclusion 
The research of a leverage of control by awarding new stocks takes place in a double logic of 
economic creation of value through incentives and of substitution of the initial dominant 
shareholder by managers and executives. Respecting the global maintenance of control, both 
the logic of substitution in ownership and the one of best incentive contracts, are strictly 
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compatible and push in the same direction. The diffusion of stocks through ownership or 
options plans to other categories of executives or employees may still respect the coherence 
between an economic rationale of incentive and a political rationale of substitution. Even if 
the effort functions of the executives are weakly productive, we showed that a joint 
equilibrium is still possible. More, even if the effort functions of some agents are not 
productive (or observable), we pointed out that a political logic of substitution is still rational 
if two conditions are met. The first one is to follow a symbolic policy of distribution of a very 
small numbers of stocks to numerous people. The other one is that, globally, it exist a 
sufficient economic incentive for the highly efficient agents whose effort will create a large 
additional cash flow. The development of a leverage of control is only possible if the 
economic incentive is globally productive. This is the basic condition to allow a substitution 
of the dominant shareholder by managers and executives who are globally well stimulated. If 
they are not, the dominant shareholder will have to consider a trade-off between economic 
and political logics.  
 
The substitution and the collusion of the dominant shareholder with managers and executives 
allow the first to maintain his appropriation of the profit derived from control. The question of 
sharing the private benefits within the new controlling is addressed. We saw that the 
controlling shareholder has to abandon a share of the private benefits to managers. A rationale 
of coalition would address the question of sharing rule equilibrium because ex ante the 
coalition should be seen as stable by both parties. We highlight that an implicit contract of 
coalition exists and had admissible designs for both parties. 
 
Different propositions are drawn which can be empirically tested. For instance, the awarding 
of new stock ownership plans should be crossed with new equilibriums in the structure of the 
controlling group of the firm. The market reaction should not be the same compared to firms 
with dispersed ownership. The model can also be improved in further analysis. The first idea 
should be to take in account a lower expected rate of return used by the dominant shareholder 
to evaluate the firm. We know that he/she has to pay a specific premium because of his 
concentration of wealth in the controlled firm. A substitution in ownership (but not in control) 
will make him profiting from a better diversification. This element adds on the benefits drawn 
by the controlling shareholder from the operation. Similarly, the managers and executives will 
use a higher valuation rate to take into account the lower diversification of their human and 
financial capital.  
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1
 This figure are to be put in the context of an existing bias in favor of a « Broad plan » : they do no request a 
mandatory agreement of the shareholders’ general meeting before launching.  
2
 After a maximum outstanding amount of 238 billions USD in 2000 with the NTIC bubble. 
3
 Estimation from the National Center on Employee Ownership (NCEO) reported by Hall and Murphy, p7 
4
 They used the definition from the NCEO who considers that a stock option plan is broad-based if 50% of the 
firm’s employees receive stock options, whatever their distribution.  
5
 A legal analysis can be developed at this level. Generally, a vesting period exists, for instance, because of tax 
reasons. But in certain situations, stock options contracts include early exercise possibilities in case of takeover 
or major events. These clauses of « accelerated vesting » are common for stock options awarded to top 
managers, particularly in the US.  
6
 We acknowledge that the effort function will depend on the structure of the compensation scheme of the 
managers(executives). Wealth in form of a stock grant will induce a different effort compared to wealth from a 
fixed payment. Here the stock grant will modify the structure of the compensation package. We develop a 
marginal approach and assume that the stock grant will not modify the incentive equilibrium designed before.  
7
 Zero cost stock awards (“Attribution d’actions gratuites”) are common in France because of the unfavourable 
tax treatment of stock options. 
8
 The possibility of a cash settlement can be input easily in the model at least conceptually. If we assume that the 
cash payment is reinvested at the risk adjusted valuation rate of the firm a cash-flow ensuing from a non zero 
exercise price can be included in the model. It creates no additional value. Results are basically similar. If we 
introduce a reinvestment rate for the cash-flow proceeds things are more complicate because it raises a problem 
of asymmetry of information between the managers and the controlling shareholder (see La Bruslerie and 
Deffains-Crapsky, 2003). 
9
 We can, for instance suppose that the individual net cash flow function resulting from effort is quadratic in 
wealth. Summing a linear positively increasing effort function e( )and a negative quadratic cost c(.), we get:.  
ft,m = et,m - ct,m= bt,m.Wt,m – at,m.Wt,m2 . The a and b coefficients will sum up the sensitivity of the increase in cash-
flow versus the impetus of a wealth increase due to the stock award. Quadratic costs or disutilities are usual in 
the literature. A continuously increasing function of cash flow gain with a strictly positive derivative will lead 
rational shareholders to an infinite wealth increase for the managers and executives. It would mean giving them 
all the equity of the firm (even if the cash flow function converges to a fixed point at infinite).The b coefficient 
above is endogenous to managers and expresses their wealth utility and their technical capacity of extracting new 
cash flow by making better management decisions. It is private information for managers. The a coefficient 
covers an induced indirect cost which can be an opportunity cost for the controlling shareholder not to give the 
managers the power and not to be expelled from the firm. 
10
 We suppose an initial situation set at the political optimum where α0 is the minimum threshold to control the 
firm. 
11
 Introducing explicitly the share market value can be handled in the model. It will not change the analysis, but 
makes it more complex by expliciting the gain linked to a lower under-diversification of the financial investment 
of the controlling shareholder. 
12
 This assumption is not necessary. Here we underline that both managers and the controlling shareholder suffer 
from wealth under-diversification. The managers’ discounting rate can be different (above or below) the one 
used by the controlling shareholder. Managers and executives who are awarded stocks concentrate their human 
capital and financial investment in the firm. We can imagine that the lower diversification will entail a specific 
risk premium to discount the future economic cash-flow stream. For instance, this will result in a valuation rate 
r’>r. It doesn’t change the logic of the managers/executives incentive behaviour. 
13
 We have dk*/d(1-λ) negative. Otherwise we get positive derivative of managers’ wealth with regard to the 
stake of equity and the share of private benefits: dWt/dkt>0 and dWt/d(1- λ)>0. These results are common sense. 
14
 I.e. a positive value for k.  
15
 We thank an anonymous referee for this remark. 
16
 This hypothesis is pessimistic. We can imagine a reduction of the total risk if the estimation errors on the 
functions of effort of the managers and the executives are not correlated. 
17
 This hypothesis will not imply that executives are inefficient. We can imagine middle executives in functional 
jobs who contribute in a binary form to the global creation of value of the firm. They play their role but without 
direct and proportional link with the operational costs or revenues. Their possible efforts will not lead to any net 
additional cash-flow because, for instance, the cost to attribute them to an executive’s action covers the gain. 
18
 Nor he supports any costs to evaluate the gain of cash flow by the executives or to monitor the executives’ 
efforts. 
19
 We saw that it will move the incentive sub-optimal contracts curve α(ft) down and left in the plane (kt+km, α). 
